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ABSTRACT 
Peoples’ subjective feelings of confidence typically correlate positively with objective 
measures of task performance, even when no performance feedback is provided. This 
relationship has seldom been investigated in the field of human time perception. Here 
we find a positive relationship between the precision of human timing perception and 
decisional confidence. We first demonstrate that subjective audio-visual timing 
judgements are more precise when people report a high, as opposed to a low, level of 
confidence. We then find that this relationship is more likely to result from variance in 
sensory timing estimates than the application of variable decision criteria, as the 
relationship help when we adopted a measure of timing sensitivity designed to limit the 
influence of subjective criteria. Our results suggest analyses of timing perception and 
associated decisional confidence reflect the trial-by-trial variability with which timing 
has been encoded. 
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HIGHLIGHTS 
• Subjective confidence estimates tend to correlate with objective perceptual 
sensitivity 
• It is unclear whether this correlation holds for time perception 
• We show that confidence correlates with the precision of time perception 
• Confidence estimates could provide insight into trial-by-trial variability of 
timing encoding 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It has repeatedly been shown that humans can successfully report when their perceptual 
judgements have been accurate, even in the absence of explicit feedback regarding task 
performance (for reviews see Yeung & Summerfield, 2012; Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 
2012). This insight has been demonstrated in a number of contexts, including the 
differentiation of motion direction (Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2012), spatial 
frequency, orientation (de Gardelle & Mamassian, 2014), and when judging luminance-
contrast (Song et al., 2011). This suggests that, in each case, humans have access to an 
accurate reportable estimate concerning the strength of evidence underlying their 
perceptual decisions. Therefore, confidence has been classified as a form of 
metacognition (Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 2012). 
 
Despite its demonstration in many types of perceptual judgements, metacognitive 
insight into human time perception has seldom been investigated. One study, however, 
has provided suggestive evidence. Allan (1975) had participants make audio-visual 
temporal order judgements, followed by a confidence categorisation (high or low) 
concerning their timing judgement. Visual appraisal of distributions of high-confidence 
order judgements showed a discrepancy relative to overall distributions (which 
comprised both high and low confidence order judgements). The different sets of 
distributions seemed non-parallel, suggesting different computational processes had 
been involved in judgements of the two temporal orders. 
 
Allan’s (1975) observations have interesting implications, as they would contradict a 
prominent class of timing perception models. These assume that encoded signals must 
propagate to a common neural site, with relative subjective timing scaling with 
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differences in arrival times at the central comparator (e.g., Sternberg & Knoll, 1973). 
Further, these models assume that neural propagation times vary from trial-to-trial, 
obeying a Gaussian distribution, and that encoded timing differences are referenced 
against fixed timing criteria (for instance, to denote when a given signal has preceded 
or lagged another). Predicted discriminant functions can take the form of a cumulative 
Gaussian, with a slope determined by trial-to-trial variance in encoded signal arrival 
time differences (Baron, 1969, see Figure 1). For simplicity, we can assume an unbiased 
observer, such that the criterion used for categorising timing differences as denoting a 
lead or lag is physical synchrony (0 ms), with negative and positive encoded values 
prompting audio lead and lag categorisations respectively. 
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Figure 1. Simulated temporal order judgement data. The arrival times of audio and visual signals at a 
central comparator are assumed to be variable from trial-to-trial, generating a Gaussian distribution of 
encoded arrival time differences for any given physical offset. Here mean arrival time differences are 
assumed to be equal to the physical timing difference, with standard deviations of 50 ms. These 
differences in encoded arrival time are compared against a fixed order criterion of 0 ms. Presentations 
yielding a negative encoded difference are reported as an audio-lead presentation, whereas presentations 
yielding a positive encoded difference are reporting as a visual lead. The prediction is well established 
analytically, but for comparison with subsequent simulations, here each physical stimulus onset 
asynchrony was sampled 1,000 times. 
 
The above generic class of human timing perception models can be extended to capture 
confidence by assuming 2 additional criteria, one denoting the extent by which an 
encoded signal must fall under the fixed timing criterion to prompt a high-confidence 
lead response, and another denoting the extent by which an encoded signal must exceed 
the fixed criterion to prompt a high-confidence lag response. Low confidence is 
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reported when encoded differences fall between these two confidence criteria. The 
important point of difference between predictions of this class of model, and Allan’s 
suggestive report, is that they predict parallel high-confidence discriminant functions 
(see Figure 2, left panel).  
 
Response simulations, based on a generic model of human timing perception, reveal 
that this scheme also predicts a difference in low and high-confidence discriminant 
function slopes (see Figure 2, right panel), something that Allan (1975) did not directly 
investigate. For audio-visual judgements, this implies one should transition from 
predominantly responding sound first, to predominantly responding light first, over a 
smaller expanse of test offsets when confident than when unconfident. This prediction 
depends on all combinations of order and confidence relying on the same source of 
information, in this case encoded signal arrival time differences, which vary from trial-
to-trial (e.g., Sternberg & Knoll, 1973). This contrasts with Allan’s suggestion, that 
discrepant processes underlie confident sound and light first reports.  
 
Figure 2. Simulated temporal order judgements. Order judgements are made according to the process 
described in main text, and simulated in Figure 1. Here, two additional fixed confidence criteria are 
placed (at –50 and +50 ms). Left) Distributions of high-confidence order judgements, for reporting that 
sound had led visual signals (plotted in reverse to aid comparison), and for reporting that visual signals 
had led sound. Note that these predicted discriminant functions are parallel. Right) Order judgements 
are plotted for high and low-confidence order judgements. Data are plotted for onset asynchronies 
yielding between 20 and 80% high confidence. This avoids fitting discriminant functions for the two 
confidence conditions to different ranges of physical test timings, and prevents under-sampled 
asynchronies distorting function-fitting procedures (e.g., large asynchronies are likely to be under-
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sampled in the low-confidence distribution, while small asynchronies are likely to be under-sampled in 
the high-confidence distribution). Cumulative Gaussian functions were fit to simulated distributions of 
encoded temporal order using the psignifit toolbox for MATLAB1.  
 
 
An alternate possibility is that, instead of trial-by-trial variability in encoded timing 
differences, there is little or no such variability. Instead, discrepant low and high-
confidence discriminant functions could result from people adopting variable decision 
criteria from trial-to-trial (Ulrich, 1987; Yarrow, Jahn, Durant & Arnold, 2011; Yarrow, 
Sverdrup-Stueland, Roseboom, & Arnold, 2013). For instance, people might adopt 
more variable criteria when low in confidence. This would predict that confidence-
based differences in the precision of timing perception should be minimised, or 
eliminated, by limiting the influence of subjective decisional criteria. 
 
In this study we aimed to determine whether subjective confidence predicts the 
precision of human timing perception, and to assess whether high-confidence 
categorical discriminant functions for timing are parallel. We present two experiments. 
In Experiment 1 we show that high-confidence temporal order judgements are more 
precise than low-confidence order judgements, and that high-confidence light-first and 
sound-first discriminant functions are, on average, parallel. In Experiment 2 we show 
that the greater timing precision suggested in Experiment 1 for high-confidence trials 
generalises to objective performance in a task designed to minimise the influence of 
subjective decisional criteria. In combination, our data are consistent with models of 
human timing perception that assume Gaussian trial-by-trial distributions of encoded 
timing differences, which are referenced against fixed decisional criteria.  
 
                                                        
1
 See http://www.bootstrap-software.org/psignifit/ 
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1.0 Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 we made use of a classic temporal perception task—a binary temporal 
order judgement (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961)—followed by a binary classification of low 
or high confidence in the preceding timing decision. In line with previous literature, we 
predict that psychological experiences of temporal order will be more precise when 
people report high confidence. 
 
1.1 Methods 
Eight adults (five male; M = 25.38 years, SD = 6.59 years) volunteered to participate in 
three blocks of 240 trials each (detailed below). Three of the four authors participated, 
in addition to five volunteers who were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported no history of 
hearing loss.  
 
At the start of each trial a red dot, with a diameter subtending 0.70 degrees of visual 
angle (dva) at the retina, was presented in the middle of the display. After a variable 
delay (1–1.5 seconds) an auditory and a visual event were presented. The visual event 
consisted of a white Gaussian blob (diameter = 6.78 dva, σ = 0.88 dva) with a peak 
luminance intensity of approximately 120 cdm-2. Visual stimuli were presented at 
fixation for 8.33 ms (1 frame at 120 Hz) against a black background on a gamma-
corrected 21-inch Samsung SyncMaster 1100p+ monitor with a resolution of 
1024 × 768 pixels. Visual stimuli were generated using a Cambridge Research Systems 
ViSaGe stimulus generator and were viewed from a distance of 57cm with the 
participants’ head restrained by a chin rest. The auditory event was a 1000 Hz pure tone 
presented for 10 ms with 5 ms linear onset/offset ramps. These were presented 
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binaurally via Sennheiser HDA 200 headphones at an intensity of ~68 dB SPL. 
Auditory stimuli were generated via a Tucker Davis Technology (TDT) psychoacoustic 
processor. Auditory triggers, timed to coincide with a monitor refresh, ensured precise 
timing of stimulus presentation. 
 
On each trial (schematised in Figure 3) the presentation of visual and audio events was 
offset by one of 12 pre-defined stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs; ±300 ms, ±200 ms, 
±100 ms, ±75 ms, ±50 ms, & ±25 ms, with negative values indicating an audio lead). 
These offsets were doubled for one participant. Participants were required to report 
which stimulus had been presented first by pressing one of two mouse buttons, or to 
press a third button if they had experienced a lapse in attention/concentration. When 
this third button was pressed test stimuli were re-presented, before moving on to the 
next trial. Following each order judgement, participants were prompted to report their 
level of decision confidence (high or low) by pressing one of two mouse buttons. 
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Figure 3. Stimulus presentation sequence in a 300 ms audio-lag trial. 
 
During each block of trials, each of 12 audio-visual timing relationships was sampled 
(without replacement) 20 times in a random order, yielding 240 trials per block (with 
some trials containing additional presentations, if the participant reported lapses in 
attention/concentration). Each participant completed three blocks of trials, resulting in 
each individual successfully completing 720 individual trials. For the purposes of 
analysis, data were collated across the three blocks of trials completed by each 
participant. 
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We fit cumulative Gaussian functions (using the psignifit toolbox for MATLAB2) to 
each participant’s order judgements (expressed as a proportion of trials on which the 
participant reported an audio-lag) separately for high- and low-confidence trials. 
Participants’ just noticeable timing differences (JNDs) were estimated from the 
difference between the SOAs associated with the 50% and 80% points on the fitted 
functions. For each participant we identified and analysed order judgements from SOAs 
associated with between 20% and 80% reports of high confidence (SOAs associated 
with extremely high or low confidence were not included in these analyses). This was 
done to ensure that low and high confidence data related to a common range of test 
SOAs.  
 
1.2 Results 
A paired-samples t-test compared participants’ JNDs associated with high- and low-
confidence judgements of temporal order (see Figure 4). This analysis revealed that 
participants reliably differentiated temporal order at smaller SOAs when reporting high 
(M = 33.98 ms, SD = 20.09 ms) as opposed to low (M = 80.68 ms, SD = 46.09 ms) 
confidence (t7 = 3.89, p = .006). This pattern was consistent across the majority of 
observers; see individual plots in Figure 5.  
 
                                                        
2
 See http://www.bootstrap-software.org/psignifit/ 
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Figure 4. Just noticeable difference (JND) magnitudes for low- and high-confidence trials for each 
participant. Grey lines depict individual participants, while the black line indicates group averages. 
Error bars depict standard error of the mean. Smaller JNDs indicate greater sensitivity.  
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Figure 5. Cumulative Gaussian distributions fitted to participants’ low- and high-confidence reports of 
temporal order. Negative stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) indicate audio-first presentations. These 
distributions were fit to SOAs associated with high confidence on between 20 and 80% of trials. 
Asterisks indicate author responses. 
 
Low-confidence responses might disproportionately represent trials associated with a 
lapse in attention/concentration, resulting in guessing behaviour and thus solely 
explaining apparent sensitivity differences. Attentional lapses should, however, be 
uniformly distributed across sampled SOAs. To assess the possibility that low 
confidence is driven by lapses, we fit Guassian distributions to individual data 
describing proportions of low-confidence trials as a function of test SOA. These 
provided a good description of individual data, and were centred approximately about 
 14 
physical synchrony (see Figure 6). These analyses show that low-confidence 
distributions were highly non-uniform relative to test SOA, with participants more 
likely to report low confidence for small SOAs. 
 
To further test whether lapse rate made a substantial contribution to apparent timing 
sensitivity differences, we estimated individual lapse rates from overall numbers of 
incorrect responses at large SOAs (±300 ms and ±200 ms), guided by the assumption 
that erroneous order judgements at these large SOAs resulted from lapses in attention. 
Lapse rates were estimated as double the individual error rate averaged across these 
SOAs. We then calculated the increase in individual guessing rates required to explain 
discrepancies between high and low confidence data. This was estimated from residual 
differences (high confidence – low confidence) in proportions of light/sound first 
judgements from chance (50%). Individual data were averaged across SOAs associated 
with high confidence on between 20 and 80% of trials. A paired-samples t-test revealed 
that the requisite increases in guessing rates (M = 22.71%, SD = 13.85%) were greater 
than estimated lapse rates (M = 4.17%, SD = 6.04%; t7 = 3.24, p = .014).  
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Figure 6. Gaussian distributions fitted to participants’ reports of low confidence at each stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA). Negative SOAs indicate audio-first presentations. Each panel in Figure 6 
corresponds to the panel in the same relative location of Figure 5. Asterisks indicate author responses. 
 
 
Allan (1975) claimed (without inferential statistical support) that participants in her 
temporal order judgement task had produced skewed responses to the two temporal 
orders under conditions of high confidence, with light-first responses negatively 
skewed and tone-first responses positively skewed. This would call some models of 
time perception into question, as they predict parallel discriminant functions for high 
confidence judgements. Here (Figure 7) we plot individual discriminant functions for 
high confidence order reports, along with data averaged across 7 participants (inclusive 
of data from all participants, except one, who had required that physical offsets be 
doubled). We see no evidence of a systematic difference in the shape of discriminant 
functions. We fit cumulative Gaussian functions to individual discriminant functions. 
A within-participant t-test found that the slope of functions fitted to audio-lag data 
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(M = 70.76, SD = 14.4) was not reliably different from audio-lead data (M = 74.19, 
SD = 12.88), suggesting the two sets of functions are best described as parallel across 
participants (t7 = 0.27, p = .797). 
Figure 7. High confidence reports of flash-first (black), and 1 – audio-first (red) for all participants, along 
with data average across 7 participants (top-right). Negative stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) indicate 
audio-first presentations. Audio-first response probabilities have been subtracted from 1 to facilitate 
comparison.  
 
 
1.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 1 we aimed to determine whether humans have metacognitive insight 
into the strength of sensory evidence supporting their classifications of temporal order. 
We did so by measuring the magnitude of the temporal offset required for participants 
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to reliably discern order when they had expressed either a high or low level of 
confidence in their order judgements. We found participants were able to discern 
temporal order when presented with smaller temporal offsets on trials in which they 
had expressed high as opposed to low confidence. 
 
A common criticism of analyses of data split according to confidence is that low-
confidence responses might disproportionately capture trials on which participants had 
experienced a lapse in attention/concentration, resulting in guessing behaviour. In the 
extreme, it could be argued that there is no difference in sensitivity between high and 
low confidence data after accounting for this influence. Two features of our data speak 
against this possibility. First, low-confidence reports were non-uniformly distributed as 
a function test SOA, concentrated at the smallest SOAs. This is inconsistent with low 
confidence data resulting from lapses in attention, as such lapses should not 
systematically coincide with a specific range of test SOAs. Second, we were able to 
estimate what increase in guessing rate would be required to explain discrepancies 
between the precision of low and high confidence timing data, and compare this with 
lapse rates estimated from performance on large SOA trials. We found that guessing 
rates required to explain confidence-based differences in task performance precision 
(~23%) were considerably greater than estimates of the observed lapse rate (~4%).  
 
Overall, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that humans have insight into the strength 
of evidence underlying their decision when making temporal order judgements. This 
was evidenced by participants needing a smaller temporal offset to transition between 
perceived orders (auditory event before visual, or vice versa) when reporting a high, as 
opposed to a low level of confidence. However, it remains unclear whether the effect 
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observed here is reflective of variable timing encodings from trial-to-trial, or to the 
application of variable subjective decisional criteria. In Experiment 2 we aim to 
determine which of these explanations is more plausible by taking steps to minimise 
the influence of subjective timing criteria.  
 
2.0 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 aims to determine whether the positive relationship between confidence 
and the precision of subjective timing judgements generalises to more objective 
measures of perceptual sensitivity. Further, this experiment aims to determine whether 
it is more likely this relationship is shaped by insight into the strength of encoded timing 
information, or the application of variable timing decisional criteria. Here we use a 3-
alternative odd-one-out paradigm. This minimises the impact of subjective criteria, by 
avoiding any requirement for participants to categorise inputs along a nominated 
dimension (such as sound first, or light first). Instead, sensitivity to any difference is 
assessed by having people choose which of three stimuli differs from the other two. 
Accuracy can therefore be interpreted as a measure of perceptual sensitivity (Green & 
Swets, 1974; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). 
 
2.1 Methods 
Eight adults (six male; M = 26.14 years, SD = 6.39 years) volunteered to participate in 
four bocks of 120 trials each (detailed below). Three of the four authors participated, in 
addition to five volunteers who were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. Seven 
of eight participants had participated in Experiment 1. All participants reported normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of hearing loss.  
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This task involved sequential presentations of three pairs of audio-visual signals. Visual 
signals consisted of a single 10 ms pulse of a green light-emitting diode, with a peak 
luminance intensity of ~125 cdm-2 and 5 ms linear onset and offset ramps. Auditory 
events consisted of a 1000 Hz pure tone presented for 10 ms, with 5 ms linear 
onset/offset ramps. Tones had a peak auditory intensity of ~63 dB SPL at 57 cm and 
were presented via a single PC speaker. Both visual and auditory signals were generated 
and presented with precision timing by a TDT psychoacoustic workstation. The diode 
was positioned directly in front of the speaker. Participants viewed the apparatus in a 
darkened room from a distance of 57 cm, with their head restrained by a chin rest. 
 
On each trial, participants were required to report which of the three test presentations 
was temporally distinct. Audio and visual events during two of the three presentations 
were physically synchronous, whereas audio and visual signals in the third pairing were 
asynchronous. Participants indicated which presentation they thought was temporally 
distinct by pressing one of three buttons on a computer mouse, or they could report a 
lapse in attention/concentration by holding down any mouse button until a distinct tone 
occurred. If a participant reported a lapse, the trial was repeated with presentation order 
re-randomised. Participants then reported their confidence (low or high) in their 
judgement. Inter-stimulus intervals varied randomly between 1 and 1.3 seconds on a 
presentation-by-presentation basis, to avoid participants using presentation rhythmicity 
as a reliable timing cue. No feedback was provided regarding task performance. 
 
In two blocks of trials the target pairing was an audio-lead, whereas in the other two 
the target was an audio-lag. Participants first completed block one of the audio-lead 
targets, and then all remaining blocks in randomised order. Participants were not told 
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what type of target they were attempting to identify. The first 40 trials of the first block 
(for each target type) were used to estimate a 75% accuracy threshold, with sampling 
controlled via a one-up/one-down staircase procedure. This process involved the 
presentation of trials containing an asynchronous target with an SOA determined by the 
participant’s accuracy on the previous trial. Stimuli in the target pairing were initially 
offset by 400 ms. Each correct/incorrect identification of the target decreased/increased 
the SOA of the target pairing by 25 ms. Upon the completion of these trials, a logistic 
function was fit to participants’ accuracy as a function of SOA using the psignifit 
toolbox for MATLAB. We used this logistic function to estimate the SOA each 
participant would be able to accurately identify on 75% of trials. These SOAs are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2 with their corresponding overall and conditional accuracies, 
as well as the proportion of trials on which participants reported high confidence. 
 
 
Figure 8. Stimulus sequence in an audio-lag-deviant block, on a trial where the target pairing was 
presented third. 
 21 
 
In the final 80 individual trials of the first block of trials, and for all 120 trials in the 
second, the target audio-visual offset was set to the participants’ 75% threshold for that 
experimental condition. The order in which the deviant target was presented (i.e., 1st, 
2nd, or 3rd) was randomised (without replacement) for each trial within each block 
(including the threshold-assessment trials in the first block). Each participant’s 
accuracy was calculated for high- and low-confidence trials separately (based only on 
non-staircase trials) and then directly compared within participants. 
 
2.2 Results 
In general, our calibration measures equated accuracy across target-type and between 
participants at ~75%. Tables 1 and 2 (below) present each participant’s SOA in each 
target condition, with their overall and conditional accuracy, and the proportion of trials 
responded to with high confidence. 
SOA 
(ms) 
High confidence 
trials (%) 
Accuracy (%) 
Overall Low Confidence High Confidence 
–94 57 81.5 65.12 93.86 
–189 60 92.5 81.25 100 
–352 68.5 82.5 58.73 93.43 
–166 52.5 72.5 65.26 79.05 
–97 37 63 50.79 83.78 
–181 61.5 53 31.17 66.67 
–229 67 79 66.67 85.07 
–106 72 71 41.07 82.64 
Mean 59.44 74.38 57.51 85.56 
Table 1. Summary of data collected from participants completing audio-lead target blocks. 
 
SOA 
(ms) 
High confidence 
trials (%) 
Accuracy (%) 
Overall Low Confidence High Confidence 
89 67.5 88.5 67.69 98.52 
20 24 52.5 49.34 62.5 
282 47 64 48.11 81.91 
108 71 79.5 65.52 85.21 
70 28.5 46 41.26 57.89 
385 53.5 39 35.48 42.06 
320 81 80.5 55.26 86.42 
70 66.5 79.5 52.24 93.23 
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Mean 54.88 66.19 51.86 75.97 
Table 2. Summary of data collected from participants completing audio-lag target blocks. 
 
A 2 (target-type: auditory-lead, auditory-lag) × 2 (confidence: high, low) repeated-
measures ANOVA on ternary detection accuracy revealed a main effect of confidence 
on accuracy, with participants demonstrating greater accuracy when reporting high 
(M = 81%, SD = 16%) as opposed to low (M = 55%, SD = 14%) confidence 
(F1, 7 = 71.87, p = < .001; see Figure 8). There was, however, no evidence for a main 
effect of target-type on accuracy, with participants similarly able to identify audio-lead 
(M = 71%, SD = 19%) and audio-lag (M = 64%, SD = 20%; F1, 7 = 2.25, p = .177) 
targets. This was expected, since performance was equated at ~75% for each target 
type. Finally, there was no evidence of an interaction between target-type and 
confidence (F1, 7 = 0.72, p = .424). 
 
 
Figure 9. Participants’ accuracy in a 3AFC asynchrony detection task across low (LC) and high 
confidence (HC). Targets were (in separate blocks) an audio lead (AV; left) and lag (VA; right). As in 
Figure 4, grey lines indicate performance of individual participants, while black bars indicate group 
means. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
Accuracy can be artefactually depressed by a response bias, for example by a 
participant preferentially choosing one of three intervals when in doubt as to which 
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interval might contain the target (NcNicol, 1972). To determine whether response 
biases changed as a function of confidence, confounding our finding, we conducted a 
3 (interval: first, second, third) × 2 (confidence: high, low) × 2 (target-type: auditory-
lead, auditory-lag) repeated-measures ANOVA on interval choice frequency. This 
yielded no systematic biases in interval choice frequency. There was no main effect of 
interval (F2,14 = 0.27, p = .746, ε = .90), nor an interaction between interval and 
confidence (F2,14 = 0.82, p = .433, ε = .75). Hence we can conclude that the observed 
difference in accuracy between high- and low-confidence trials was not a result of 
distinct biases. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 again demonstrate that human participants have insight 
into the accuracy of their timing judgements. By design, in this experiment we limited 
the influence of subjective timing criteria by asking participants to identify which of 
three presentations was distinct from the other two. This provides a measure of 
objective timing sensitivity, as opposed to the more common subjective timing 
categorisation task (TOJ). Performance on the latter task can be strongly affected by 
any preference to categorise trials as having been sound first, or light first, whereas the 
former task disregards this subjective impression. Instead, the present task measures 
participants’ ability to differentiate stimuli on the basis of physical differences, 
regardless of how those differences are experienced. Performance in mAFC tasks can 
be affected by any preference to select one presentation over the other two, but an 
analysis of our data revealed no such tendency. We can therefore conclude that 
participants displayed insight into the degree to which they had encoded timing 
correctly.  
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As in Experiment 1, participants had the option of indicating that they had suffered a 
lapse in attention/concentration. When this occurred, the trial was repeated with 
presentation order re-randomised. This meant that the oddball target was randomly re-
assigned to any one of the three presentation intervals. Assuming participants are aware 
of their own lapses, this measure achieved two ends. First, it indicates low confidence 
responses are not simply lapses in concentration. Moreover, the re-randomisation of 
presentation order dictated that participants could not benefit from a repeated trial. If 
presentation order had not had not been re-randomised, the repetition of a given trial 
order could have resulted in improved performance and high confidence.  
 
3.0 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Our results demonstrate that humans have insight into the strength of encoded 
information underlying audio-visual timing judgements. This was apparent as, without 
task performance feedback, confidence predicted the precision of order judgements. 
More precise order judgements on high, as opposed to low confidence trials cannot be 
attributed solely to people guessing on a disproportionate number of low confidence 
trials, as lapse rates suggested by errors on simple trials were too few to account for 
confidence-based timing sensitivity differences. Nor can our data be attributed to 
people adopting more rigid subjective criteria on high, as opposed to low, confidence 
trials, as we also found evidence for heighted timing sensitivity on high confidence 
trials when people completed a three-alternative odd-one-out protocol, which 
minimised the influence of subjective response criteria. 
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Overall, our data are consistent with a generic class of timing perception models, which 
assume that temporal order judgements, and confidence in those decisions, is informed 
by a common source of variable encoded information (e.g., Allan, 1975; Sternberg & 
Knoll, 1973). Here the pertinent information refers to variable encodings of audio-
visual timing differences.  Importantly, in Experiment 2, our data related to a constant 
set of physical timing relationships, repeatedly sampled on different trials (two 
synchronous audio-visual presentations and one constant audio-visual asynchrony). 
Yet, despite the constant nature of stimulation, confidence predicted the precision with 
which people could identify the discrepant asynchronous stimulus presentation on a 
trial-by-trial basis. Moreover, as analyses revealed no evidence for a bias to 
preferentially select one of the three test intervals on each trial, our data suggest this 
relationship was due solely to trial-by-trial differences in how the pertinent timing 
relationships were encoded. 
 
A plausible interpretation of our data is that, in this context, confidence might be a 
reportable estimate of the extent by which sensory evidence has exceeded decisional 
criteria (Ferrell & McGoey, 1980). This presumes that temporal judgements, and 
confidence in those judgements, are informed by a common source of information: 
encodings of timing differences that fluctuate from trial-to-trial. This implies that, 
unless some additional factor exists, confidence and the sensitivity of timing 
judgements should be invariably related. However, in other contexts, additional factors 
have been implicated (for reviews, see Yeung & Summerfield, 2012; Fleming, Dolan 
& Frith, 2012). For instance, Spence et al. (in press) recently reported that variable 
motion-direction signals could be equated in terms of discriminability, but result in 
different levels of decisional confidence (see also de Gardelle & Mamassian, 2015). 
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Such findings suggest that sensitivity and decisional confidence rely on independent 
and differentially weighted transformations of encoded signals. It remains to be seen 
whether similar dissociations of confidence and sensitivity will emerge in timing 
perception. 
 
A final implication of our data is that encoded timing relationships are likely to be quite 
variable. Within an individual, encoded timing relationships seem to vary from trial-to-
trial, resulting in marked confidence-based differences in the precision of timing 
judgements from-to-trial. Perusal of Figure 5 also suggests marked individual 
differences in the extent of trial-by-trial variability. This is interesting, as relatively 
poor timing judgements have been linked to such conditions such as schizophrenia, 
depression and dysthymia  (Rammsayer, 1990; Bonnot et al., 2011; Gil & Droit-Volet, 
2009), Parkinson’s disease (Pastor et al., 1992), and attention-deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (Smith et al., 2002; Meaux & Chelonis, 2003). Our data thus suggest that 
confidence could be used as a tool to investigate the precision of timing encoding, both 
on an individual basis and within specific clinical sub-populations.   
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